Abstract. We study the quality ranking of different information structures. In a unified setting, we present eight representations of essentially the same notion that may arise in distinct literatures, and also establish the intricate relationships among them. The forms that are less familiar to researchers turn out to be more relevant to the operations management context. We also relate the information structure ranking to concepts often invoked in operations management literature, such as advance demand information and decision postponement. Using some of the established relations, we argue for building a cross-docking facility as close as possible to the distribution centers it serves.
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Abstract. We study the quality ranking of different information structures. In a unified setting, we present eight representations of essentially the same notion that may arise in distinct literatures, and also establish the intricate relationships among them. The forms that are less familiar to researchers turn out to be more relevant to the operations management context. We also relate the information structure ranking to concepts often invoked in operations management literature, such as advance demand information and decision postponement. Using some of the established relations, we argue for building a cross-docking facility as close as possible to the distribution centers it serves.
1. Introduction. It has been well accepted in operations management (OM) literature that better information leads to better decision making. In this paper, we make an attempt to render the concept of "having better (higher-quality) information" concrete, and identify the exact circumstances under which this better information will help to reap higher gains.
In fields of economics, statistics, and operations management, there have emerged many forms representing essentially the same idea of information ranking. Most of the forms, especially those from operations management, have not been presented in their full generality; though works have appeared that connect subsets of these forms, no attempt has been made to discuss these forms in a unified framework. In this paper, we present these forms as eight conditions in a general framework. Using self-developed tools along with known techniques, we establish fairly exhaustive relationships among these conditions. Some of these relationships are new, while others may have appeared in the literature in different contexts.
Comparing the above notion of "having better information" to other existing concepts in the OM literature, we find the following:
(i) "having more information," exemplified by the concept of "advance demand information," is a special case of "having better information"; (ii) the postponement of observations while the system under scrutiny evolves as a Markov process results in the acquisition of better information; and, (iii) results for the postponement case can be applied to a location problem involving a cross-docking facility.
The concept of information ranking was first proposed in the statistics context in the late 1940's and early 1950's; see, e.g., Bohnenblust et al. [4] , Blackwell [2] [3], Sherman [18] , and Stein [19] . The reader may also refer to a review of information systems' comparability by Marschak and Miyasawa [14] . Extensions and generalizations were made in directions of more general observation and outcome sets (Boll [5] ) and more robust relationships (LeCam [13] ). In addition, some notions of information quality ranking were known to economists; see, e.g., Mertens et al. [15] .
The value of information has been a hotly pursued topic in recent OM literature. Güllü [10] showed the value of better demand forecasting for a production system when the forecasting follows the additive evolution model. On the front of "advance demand information," Hariharan and Zipkin [11] , Gallego andÖzer [7] , Toktay and Wein [20] , etc., all made valuable contributions under different stochastic inventory control settings.Özer [17] extended Gallego andÖzer [7] to a one-warehouse multiretailer system.
Relatedly, Gavirneni et al. [8] showed that a supplier could benefit from knowing more about its downstream retailer. Milgrom and Roberts [16] examined the tradeoff between purchasing demand information and building up inventory for a supplier facing a number of customers. Zhu and Thonemann [23] concentrated on the same tradeoff for a more general case with imperfect information sharing and correlated demand levels among customers.
We summarize our main contributions in the following: (a) the formulation of general conditions expressing information quality ranking that are suitable for OM studies;
(b) the establishment of links among various conditions for the notion of information quality ranking; (c) the development of the Bayesian dual, a useful tool for obtaining various virtual equivalences between different forms of the same notion; and (d) the clarification of the inter-connectivity among different forms and concepts that were previously scattered in the statistics, economics, and OM literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss two of the most important OM-oriented concepts in a simple setting, and at the same time, demonstrate the critical role played by these concepts in helping select locations for cross-docking facilities; in Section 3, we prepare the reader with our notation and main proof tool, the Bayesian dual; in Section 4, we introduce the forms of the notion on information quality ranking and establish relationships among these forms; in Section 5, we show the application of the general notion to OM studies; finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
Simple illustrations.
2.1. The two OM-oriented conditions. We use a simple setting to shed light on the two most important, OM-oriented conditions which we shall later term as conditions (I) and (II). In this setting, an underlying random variable Ω takes values from a finite setΩ. We use P (·) to denote the probability distribution for Ω to attain its various values. It may be helpful to imagine Ω as a random demand to be revealed in the future.
An information structure I essentially defines the relationship of another random variable Θ with respect to Ω. Through observing Θ, one may learn something about Ω. We suppose Θ takes values from a finite setΘ. We use Q(·) to denote the probability distribution for Θ to attain its various values and use R(· | ·) to denote the conditional probability for Ω to attain its values when the realization of Θ is known. We shall consider I ≡ (Θ, Q, R) an information structure for the underlying random object (Ω, P ) when the posterior conclusion is consistent with the prior:
It may be helpful to view Θ as the combination of observations made about the future demand Ω by a certain time point. For two information structures I 1 and I 2 , we deem that the latter contains better information than the former, or I 1 ≤ I I 2 , when we have the following condition (I): There is a conditional probability S 2 1 (· | ·) for Θ 2 to attain its various values when the realization of Θ 1 is known, necessarily satisfying
such that
In essence, we have I 1 ≤ I I 2 when Θ 2 is a randomization of Θ 1 , while Ω is a randomization of Θ 2 . It may be helpful to understand I 1 as one reflecting observations made by an earlier time point and I 2 as one reflecting those by a later time point. Suppose we are to make a random decision at the time when I describes the available information, while the impact of the decision depends on the realization of Ω. To describe this, we introduce a finite action spaceΓ. Our random decision may be described by a mapping from the information setΘ to the set of probability distributions on the action spaceΓ. For any θ ∈Θ, we may use Y (· | θ) to represent the distribution and Γ Y (θ) the random action associated with this distribution. Also, our payoff from the decision may be described by a function f :Ω ×Γ →R, whereR stands for the real line. That is, our final payoff f is determined by the value ω ∈Ω settled into by the random object and the action γ ∈Γ taken by us. Our problem is to find the random policy (mixed strategy) Y allowable by the available information I that optimizes the payoff in an average sense, that is, to find f * , where
where
Our main result concerns the fact that better information leads to better decisions, as expressed by the following condition (II): For any action spaceΓ and any utility function f :Ω ×Γ →R, we have f
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Our main idea of proving the above assertion of (I)⇒(II) is that, given any random policy Y 1 under information structure I 1 , we can devise a random policy Y 2 under information structure I 2 , so that
The above implies that, when I 1 ≤ I I 2 , we can identify a policy Y 2 under information structure I 2 ; in terms of performance, this policy matches even the best-performing policy Y 1 under information structure I 1 . Therefore, we have (I)⇒(II).
To construct Y 2 , we introduce the Bayesian conditional probabilitiesS
For θ 2 with Q 2 (θ 2 ) = 0, we can defineS 
In other words, when faced with information piece θ 2 , we throw a dice with distributionS 1 2 (· | θ 2 ); and, if θ 1 happens to show up, we take the action prescribed by
2.2.
A cross-docking example. Another way to say that the forgetfulness of a decision maker (DM) is not so bad as to affect his ability to predict the future is that his state of knowledge evolves as a Markov process. When such is the case, the later Section 5.2 shall show that, the quality of the information possessed by the DM will improve over time in the sense of (I). We can then use the link (I)⇒(II) to argue for the practice of having a cross-docking facility built as close to distribution centers as possible.
Suppose there is a firm which relies on an outside supplier for feeding its multiple distribution centers. It may maintain a cross-docking facility serving the sole purpose of order re-allocation, so that all orders from the supplier are sent to the facility first and then immediately dispatched to distribution centers.
Suppose that the location t of the cross-docking facility can be chosen from within a certain range [0,l]. Also, suppose there is a constantL ≥l, so that the transportation time between location t and the supplier will be t, while that between the same location and each distribution center will beL − t. When given a choice between locations t 1 and t 2 , we may use I 1 (2) to denote the information structure that reflects the learning of the final demand at the moment when goods are dispatched from the facility, when the latter is located at t 1 (2) .
If demand information can be possessed over time in a Markovian fashion, then (I) will be true between I 1 and I 2 when t 1 ≤ t 2 . Hence, based on the link (I)⇒(II), we can state that more will be gained by moving the location of the facility from 0 tō l. Therefore, so long as such a cross-docking facility is not too costly to maintain, we should be willing to put it at a location as close to distribution centers as possible.
We note thatÖzer [17] also expressed the connection between the location of the central warehouse and the quality of demand information. Of course, there are other factors in real life, such as the strict triangularity of location distances, to counter balance our extreme inclination.
3. Background preparation. Before presenting the eight forms in a formal fashion and establishing their connections, we need to introduce a few notational conventions and concepts.
3.1. Notation and convention. Given measurable spaces (Â, A ) and (B, B), we say that function f :Â →B is B/A -measurable when the inverse image of every set in B through f is in A , or in other words, f −1 (B) ⊂ A . For convenience, we will sometimes call such f a (B, B)/(Â, A ) function. Under our notation, a random variable F , with (Â, A ) as its principal measurable (domain) space and (B, B) as its range space, is merely a (B, B)/(Â, A ) function F . Throughout, we useR to denote the Euclidean real line and R the Borel σ-field ofR. For probability space (Â, A , M ), everyÂ ′ ∈ A corresponds to an event; when M (Â ′ ) = 1, we say the corresponding event occurs for M -a.e. a ∈Â or in the M -almost sense.
Given probability spaces (
Let (Â, A , M ) be a given probability space. For σ-field B satisfying B ⊂ A , we use M [B] to denote the restriction of M to sets in B. For σ-fields B and C satisfying C ⊂ B ⊂ A , we use M [B/C ] to denote a version of the conditional probability resulting from the restriction of M on B being conditioned on C . That is, for every setÂ
over M (·) for sets in C . For σ-fields B, C , and D satisfying D ⊂ C ⊂ B ⊂ A , we have the chain rule that
which equates two (Â, B,
) kernels in the sense of (12).
3.2. Structured Kernels and the Bayesian dual. We say that an ( 
We may express the above simply as
. Later on, we will make the technical assumption that kernels related to information sets are structured. The following result shows that this assumption is not that stringent.
We have relegated all proofs to appendices. An ( is structured and also one in which it is not. We have put these examples in Appendix B.
We can show that a structured ( 
.
In Appendix D, we present a few more useful properties of structured kernels.
4. The quality of information. We introduce eight forms for information quality ranking in a unified framework, and also establish connections among themselves. Roughly, we may classify these conditions into two OM-oriented ones, three economics-oriented ones, and three statistics-oriented ones.
4.1.
A uniform problem setting. Let probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) be given. To describe the random outcome faced by a DM, let us introduce a measurable space (Ω, F ) and a (Ω, F )/(Ω 0 , F 0 ) random variable Ω. According to Appendix E, Ω induces a probability measure P for (Ω, F ). Now both the random variable Ω and the probability space (Ω, F , P ) can be used to model the random outcome faced by the DM.
We may use another measurable space (Γ, T ) to represent the DM's allowable actions. The DM's payoff is expressed by an (R, R)/(Ω ×Γ, F × T ) function f : if he takes action γ ∈Γ and the random outcome turns out to be ω ∈Ω, his payoff will be f (ω, γ). So that maximization is meaningful, we require the payoff function f to be bounded from above. Following the statistics literature, we may also call f a utility (negative loss) function.
The DM may possess some information about the random outcome at the time of deciding the action to take. To describe the information, we may introduce a measurable space (Θ, G ) and a (Θ, G )/(Ω 0 , F 0 ) random variable Θ, such that
From Appendix E, we may see that Θ induces a probability measure Q for (Θ, G ) and a (Ω, F , P )/(Θ, G , Q) kernel R, necessarily satisfying
Here, Q describes the distribution of the DM's observation, and R describes the distribution of the final outcome conditioned on the DM's observation. As mentioned in Section 3.2, we only consider settings where R is structured. Then, by Lemma 3.2, there exists a (Θ, G , Q)/(Ω, F , P ) kernelR, necessarily sat-
Note thatR describes the distribution of the DM's observation conditioned on the outcome. Suppose the DM is allowed to take a randomized action based on his observation, then he may pick a (Γ, T )/(Θ, G ) kernel, or random policy, say Y . On the other hand, the consequence of his random action hinges upon the random outcome. Let Y ((Γ, T )/(Θ, G )) be the space of all (Γ, T )/(Θ, G ) kernels. The DM therefore faces the problem of finding the optimal average payoff f * , where
Note that f * 's dependence on the defining probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ), the defining random variables Ω and Θ, and the dual kernelR, is only indirect.
Everything else being the same, the triplet (Θ, G , Θ), or its induced (Θ, G , Q, R), or its induced (Θ, G ,R), will certainly affect the profitability of the DM. For this reason, we may term any of the above three an information structure I. The rest of this section is about the internal connections among seemingly different rankings of two information structures.
OM-oriented rankings.
We first deal with two rankings that correspond to the ones alluded to in Section 2.1. These two conditions do not explicitly involve the defining probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) or the defining random variables Ω and Θ. Here, we call I ≡ (Θ, G , Q, R) an information structure.
For two information structures I 1 and I 2 , our condition (I) for reflecting I 1 ≤ I I 2 is as follows: There exists a structured
that also satisfies
Here, (20) is intended merely as an identity between two (Ω, F , P )/(Θ 1 , G 1 , Q 1 ) kernels; see (12) .
We use (II) to denote the following condition applicable to two information structures I 1(2) = (Θ 1(2) , G 1(2) , Q 1(2) , R 1(2) ): For any action measurable space (Γ, T ) and any utility function f based on (Ω ×Γ, F × T ),
Our main result says (I)⇒(II).
Theorem 4.1. (I) will lead to (II).
If we focus instead on deterministic policies, then we can so far only guarantee (I)⇒(II) for cases where information σ-fields are maximal, i.e., cases in which G 1(2) = 2Θ 1 (2) , the collections of all subsets ofΘ 1(2) including ∅. On the other hand, when information sets are countable, the maximality of σ-fields is the prevalent case in the literature and is often taken for granted.
4.3.
Economics-oriented rankings. Here, we resort to the full description of the outcome by the measurable space (Ω, F ) and the random variable Ω. We may view (Θ, G , Θ) as an information structure I.
We first introduce condition (III): For the generated σ-fields,
Meanwhile, the following (III') will be shown to be stronger than (III):
meaning that
(24) The gist of (III') is that, whenever the θ 2 realization is known, there will be no uncertainty about Θ 1 .
For convenience, we may, for each θ ∈Θ, denote by Γ Y (θ) the random variable with Y (· | θ) as its distribution. Let us introduce condition (II'): For any action measurable space (Γ, T ) and any utility function f based on (Ω×Γ,
We may see that (II') is slightly stronger than (II), as the existence of a performancematching policy Y * 2 is a slightly stronger requirement than that of a matching payoff f * 2 .
We have (III)⇒(I) when the resultant kernels R 1(2) and S 2 1 are structured, such as when bothΘ 1 andΘ 2 are countable. From now on, we shall implicitly assume this condition when (III)⇒(I) is referred to.
Theorem 4.2. (III) will lead to (I).
Actually, we should expect (III) to be stronger than (I). In (III), suppose Θ 1 and Θ 2 are both one-to-one, then its clear message is that G 2 is finer than G 1 . But (I), the existence of the structured kernel S 2 1 satisfying (19) and (20), does not imply that G 2 is finer than G 1 . The example in Appendix H stresses this point. On the other hand, we can easily show that (III')⇒(III).
Theorem 4.3. (III') will lead to (III).
Starting from (I), (III), or (III'), we can conclude that better information leads to higher payoffs by going through (I)⇒(II), (III)⇒(I)⇒(II), or (III')⇒(III)⇒(I)⇒(II). We can also easily establish a direct link (III')⇒(II), for both random and deterministic policies.
Theorem 4.4. (III') will lead to (II), for both random and deterministic policies.
In general, (III) is not a guarantee for (III'), as indicated by the example in Appendix K. In that example, the function Θ 2 is not one-to-one and {θ 1 } is not in G 1 for some θ 1 ∈Θ 1 . When either of these anomalies is assumed away, we will have the following result on (III)⇒(III').
Theorem 4.5. Suppose Ω is one-to-one. If Θ 2 is one-to-one, or {θ 1 } ∈ G 1 for every θ 1 ∈Θ 1 , then (III) will lead to (III').
Under certain conditions, we can show (II')⇒(III).
contains all sets of zero P measure, (II') will lead to (III).
In Theorem 4.6, the requirement for I 2 is needed towards the end of the proof. A special case of this requirement is when P (A) > 0 for every non-empty set A in F , such as whenΩ is countable and every element in it has a positive probability mass.
In most of the economics literature, information ranking is represented in a form close to (III); see., e.g., Mertens et al. [15] . The definition made by Laffont [12] was closer to (III') than to (III).
4.4.
Statistics-oriented rankings. In the statistics literature, no explicit mention of the defining probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) or the defining random variables Ω and Θ is made. Furthermore, P 0 has even no indirect involvement through P or Q. Rather, I ≡ (Θ, G ,R) is treated as an information structure.
Given utility function f , policy Y ∈Ŷ ((Γ, T )/(Θ, G )), and element ω ∈Ω, the so-called risk function v(f, Y, ω) under I is defined as follows:
We may define set J(f ) of (R, R)/(Ω, F ) functions as in
For two structures I 1 and I 2 , Bohnenblust et al. [4] first proposed the notion of I 1 being less informative than I 2 , which is expressible by the following condition (IV): For any action measurable space (Γ, T ) and any utility function f based on (Ω ×Γ, F × T ),
Somewhat related is the following condition (IV'): For any action measurable space (Γ, T ) and any utility function f based on (Ω ×Γ, F × T ),
Blackwell [2] proposed the sufficiency concept. Given two information structures I 1 and I 2 , I 2 is deemed sufficient for I 1 when we have the following condition (V):
In its original definition, the above equation between two kernels is in the componentby-component sense.
In the view point of (V), one observation is poorer than the other when the prediction for the former's specific realizations is a garbled version of that for the latter. When the above concepts were initially proposed, they were for the case where all involved sets are finite. For such a case, Sherman [18] and Stein [19] showed the equivalence between conditions (IV) and (V). Blackwell [3] generalized the equivalence to the case of bounded and separable metric spacesΘ 1 andΘ 2 . Boll [5] generalized the equivalence to essentially all (Θ 1(2) , G 1 (2) )'s and all (Ω, F )'s. The equivalence between (IV') and (V) at different levels of generality is also a known fact in the literature; see, e.g., Blackwell [2] , Cremer [6] , and Torgersen [21] .
From different angles, conditions (I) and (V) express the idea that, when the DM is given signals from both I 1 and I 2 for estimating the underlying random object, the signal from I 2 will be a sufficient statistic. Using properties of the Bayesian dual, we can show (I)⇔(V) when (30) is understood in the P -almost sense:
From now on, we shall implicitly take this understanding when (I)⇔(V) is referred to.
Theorem 4.7. Conditions (I) and (V) are equivalent.
Also, due to the fact that
(II) will lead to the following slightly relaxed version of (IV'): For any probability P defined on (Ω, F ) that enables the structuredness of kernelsR 1(2) andS 1 2 , any action space (Γ, T ), and any utility function f based on (Ω ×Γ, F × T ),
Combining this with our earlier results, we may say that conditions (I), (II), (IV), (IV'), and (V) are virtually identical. When all concerned sets are finite, Green and Stokey [9] showed (V)⇒(III') under certain restrictions. Marschak and Miyasawa [14] studied information quality ranking when all involved sets are countable and every σ-field is maximal. 4.5. A summary. We have introduced eight conditions, (I), (II), (II'), (III), (III'), (IV), (IV'), and (V), of the notion of information structure I 1 being less informative than information structure I 2 , or I 1 ≤ I I 2 . We have also found relationships among the various forms.
Ideas behind conditions (I), (II), and (II') might have been understood by OM researchers for some time. But we believe they have only been formalized in the present general forms for the first time. Variants of conditions (III) and (III') have been used by economists. As to be shown in Section 5, they also have strong bonds with OM studies. Conditions (IV), (IV'), and (V) first emerged in the statistics literature, and their inter-connections have been well understood.
Relying on both the tool of Bayesian dual and extant results, we have conclusively reached the following findings about the relative strengths of the conditions: In general, it is true that (II'), (III')⇒ (III)⇒ (I)⇔(II)⇔(IV)⇔(IV')⇔(V); under special circumstances, it may be true that (III)⇒(III').
5. Applications to operations management.
5.1.
Relations with "Having More Information". A special information quality ranking often encountered in the OM literature can be denoted by I 1 ≤ M I 2 , that of I 2 having more information than I 1 . The concept means the satisfaction of the following condition (III"): There are random variable Θ defined on measurable space (Θ, G ) and random variable Φ defined on measurable space (Φ, H ), such that, in the language of Section 4.3, I 1 = (Θ, G , Θ) and I 2 = (Θ ×Φ, G × H , (Θ, Φ)).
In essence, I 2 involves one more piece of observation than I 1 does. With this, we can define Θ 12 used in condition (III'):
So, clearly (III") will lead to (III'), the strongest version of
we can obtain (II) through the chain (III")⇒(III')⇒(III)⇒(I)⇔(II).
The allusion to "I 1 ≤ M I 2 " is prevalent in the OM literature. Take as an example a system with a one-period advancement in demand information. We use d st to denote the portion of the demand in period t that would have become certain in period s, and use D st to denote the corresponding random variable. At the end of period t, we know the realization of d t,t+1 , and the next-period demand is d t,t+1 + D t+1,t+1 . In a comparable system without advance information, the same demand can be expressed as
be Ω, the final outcome, then for system 1 that is without advance information, we have Θ 1 = dummy constant; while for system 2 that is with advance information, we have Θ 2 = (dummy constant, D t,t+1 ). Therefore, the advantage of system 2 over system 1 can be inferred from our earlier results.
Indeed, instead of trying to prove the thus apparent benefit, OM literature concentrated on finding ways to exploit and realize the potential benefit; see, e.g., Hariharan and Zipkin [11] , Gallego andÖzer [7] , and Toktay and Wein [20] . Note that the supply lead time proposed by Hariharan and Zipkin [11] fits into our model, since a system with a certain supply lead time is one where an extra observation occurs before the real occurrence of demand realization.
5.2.
Relations with decision postponement. Suppose there is a Markov chain with a known initial state j(0) and a transition matrix P = (p jk ). We denote the chain's random state after s transitions by J(s) and the chain's sth order transition matrix by P s = (p (s) jk ). We suppose the random variable of concern is J(n), the chain's state after n transitions. Also, for l = 0, 1, ..., n, we suppose our observation after l transitions is exactly J(l). Let l 1 , l 2 = 0, 1, ..., n with l 1 ≤ l 2 . We may write, for the information structures I 1 and I 2 revolving around J(l 1 ) and J(l 2 ), respectively,
We can define kernel S
By the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, we have
Therefore, we have (19) and (20), and hence I 1 ≤ I I 2 in the sense of (I). Hence, when we are not too forgetful, the link (I)⇒(II) means that it is advantageous for us to postpone decisions when other things are equal. Indeed, this benefit has long been realized by researchers and examined in the OM literature. For instance, Van Mieghem and Dada [22] compared the relative merits of postponing pricing and production decisions for a production system involving capacity acquisition under uncertainty.
Suppose our cumulative observation at time t can be described by an information structure I t ≡ (Θ t , G t , Θ t ) in the sense of Section 4.3. Naturally, we say our knowledge does not deteriorate over time when Θ −1
t (G t ) for s ≤ t, i.e., I s ≤ I I t in the sense of (III). When nothing is ever forgotten, researchers use filtrations to model the evolution of cumulative observation over time. A filtration {F t } built on a measurable space (
Here, (III) can be satisfied by lettingΘ t =Ω 0 , G t = F t , and Θ t be the identity mapping for every t.
In view of the above, (III)⇒(I) in a sense means that, a person who forgets nothing accumulates knowledge faster than one who merely does not forget too quickly.
6. Concluding remarks. We examined eight forms representing essentially the same notion of information quality ranking, and established relationships among them. Although some of the forms or their slight variants have already been known in the literature, we showed that newly-formalized conditions (I), (II), (II'), (III), and (III') are more readily usable in OM-oriented studies.
It still remains to be known whether the structuredness requirement can be relaxed for kernels to have Bayesian duals. Moreover, all our results are qualitative in nature. Undoubtedly, it will be a challenging and rewarding task to establish a framework under which quantitative results regarding the payoff of better information can be readily obtained.
Appendices
A. Proof of Lemma 3.1 12 's cross-sectional projection onÂ 2 at a 1 . By Fubini's Theorem, we haveÂ 2 (a 1 ) ∈ A 2 for any
which is equal to 0. Hence, there isÂ
2 (a 1 ). SinceÂ 1 is countable, and hence so isÂ
By the definition of M 2 1 , we know that
So in view of (39), there must beÂ
B. Structured and Unstructured Kernels whenÂ 1(2) are Real Intervals For a structured kernel, consider the following case, where N (µ, σ 2 ) stands for the Normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. Here,
2 )) kernel, we note that, corresponding to (10), we have, for any a
while intervals of the type [a
Then, for a
, we have, corresponding to (14) , that (M
Since intervals of types [a
] form π-systems that generate R, we know that M 
kernel, we note that, corresponding to (10), we have, for any a
while intervals of the form [a
Hence, M 
C. Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. Let us focus on the construction of M . For this purpose, we shall use P 2 = {Â n 2 | n = 1, 2, ...} to denote the countable π-system from which A 2 is generated.
From the definitions of M
, and m 12 , and by Fubini's Theorem, we know that
From (48), we see that, for every n = 1, 2, ..., there is setÂ
LetÂ
. We see that M 1 (Â + 1 ) = 1, and the identity in (49) applies to every n = 1, 2, ... and every a 1 ∈Â + 1 . Thus, by the fact that A 2 is generated from P 2 and the π-λ Theorem, we can write
2 by the following:
Using (50) and (51), the fact that
kernel, and Fubini's Theorem, we may note that
Hence, in view of the definition in (10), we see that M 
Therefore, M 1 2 is also structured, with
2 and follow the above procedure from (48) to (51), with the "1" and "2" super-/sub-scripts switched, we will end up with an (
1 that, due to (51) and our convention defined around (12) , may be regarded the same as our initial M 
by using (50) and (51) in the proof of Lemma 3.2, as well as Fubini's Theorem. Given probability spaces ( 
Furthermore, using Fubini's Theorem, we can obtain that, forÂ
Hence, we know that M
which is in turn equivalent to
This equivalence turns out to be useful in the proof of Theorem 4.7.
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E. Details for Section 4.1 For the outcome measurable space (Ω, F ), we may define probability P through the restriction P 0,[Ω −1 (F )] of P 0 to Ω −1 (F ):
For convenience, we may represent (59) by
For the observation measurable space (Θ, G ), we may define Q through the re-
For θ ∈Θ, we defineΩ 0 (θ) as the set of states of the world that result in the θ observation:
Apparently, {Ω 0 (θ) | θ ∈Θ} is a partition ofΩ 0 ; whereas, for anyB ∈ G , we have Θ −1 (B) = θ∈BΩ 0 (θ). From eachΩ 0 (θ), we select a representative member ω 0 and call itω 0 (θ). As (15) is true, we may define the (Ω, F )/(Θ, G ) kernel R through the restricted conditional probability P
For anyÂ ∈ F , since P
[
is an (R, R)/(Ω, Θ −1 (G )) function, while {r} ∈ R for every r ∈R, it must be true that, for any ω 0 ∈Ω 0 (θ),
Thus, the value of R(Â | θ) will not be affected by any specific choice ofω 0 (θ). For convenience, we represent (63) by
For any given θ ∈Θ, R(· | θ) is a probability measure on (Ω, F ) because P
which is equal to P (Â) by (59). Therefore, we have (16) as desired.
F. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Let r 1(2) be the (R, R)/(Θ 1(2) ×Ω,
. Note that (19) and (20) are consistent with (16), as due to Fubini's Theorem, we have
Through action randomization, we can achieve the same performance under information structure I 2 as any given policy can under information structure I 1 . To show this, we note that by (19) , we can construct S 
which necessarily satisfies
We let Y 2 be the following random policy under I 2 : when the observation is θ 2 ∈Θ 2 , we ensure that
We may define g(ω, θ 1 ) as the average payoff when the realized outcome is ω, while policy Y 1 is used and the observed information piece is θ 1 :
It is clear that g is an (R, R)/(Ω×Θ 1 , F ×G 1 ) function that is bounded from above. We can show that our randomization scheme will help reap the same payoff under information structure I 2 as under information structure I 1 :
To prove (72), let g + (ω, θ 1 ) and g − (ω, θ 1 ) be, respectively, the positive and negative parts of g(ω, θ 1 ). It suffices to show (72) when g is replaced by g + , as the part where g is replaced by g − can be similarly tackled except for the trivial case of both sides being +∞.
Following (50) in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we have
We can utilize (20) , (68), (73), and Fubini's Theorem to show that, for anyÂ ∈ F andB 1 ∈ G 1 ,
Since sets of the formÂ ×B 1 whereÂ ∈ F andB 1 ∈ G 1 generate the σ-field F × G 1 , we can deduce from the π-λ Theorem that, the above will also be true whenÂ ×B 1 is replaced by any set in F × G 1 . Since g + is the monotone limit of a sequence of simple functions in (R, R)/(Ω ×Θ 1 , F × G 1 ), we can, by the linearity of integrations and the Monotone Convergence Theorem, derive that,
By (68), (73), and Fubini's Theorem, we note that, for (72) where g + is replaced g,
while
We have LHS = RHS due to (75). Thus we have shown (72). Now according to (71) and (72), given any policy Y 1 for I 1 , we can find a performance-matching policy Y 2 for I 2 . Therefore, it must be true that f * 1 ≤ f * 2 .
G. Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. We prove the following: Given probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ), (Ω, F ) /(Ω 0 , F 0 ) random variable Ω, and (Θ 1(2) , G 1(2) )/(Ω 0 , F 0 ) random variables Θ 1(2) satisfying Θ −1
, we can construct probability P for measurable space (Ω, F ), probabilities Q 1(2) for measurable spaces (Θ 1(2) , G 1(2) ), (Ω, F )/(Θ 1(2) , G 1(2) ) kernels R 1 (2) , and (Θ 2 , G 2 )/(Θ 1 , G 1 ) kernel S 2 1 , such that P = R 1(2) ⊗ Q 1(2) , and both (19) and (20) are satisfied. Also, the kernels R 1(2) and S 2 1 will be structured whenΘ 1(2) are countable.
First, we follow (60), (61), and (65) in Appendix E to construct P , Q 1(2) , and R 1 (2) . That is, we let P = P 0,[F ;Ω] , Q 1(2) = P 0,[G 1 (2) ;Θ 1(2) ] , R 1(2) = P 0,[F /G 1 (2) ;Ω,Θ 1(2) ] .
From arguments before, we know that P = R 1(2) ⊗ Q 1 (2) . Next, we let 
From these, we see that S 2 1 will satisfy (19) and (20) . From Lemma 3.1, we know that R 1(2) and S 2 1 will be structured whenΘ 1(2) are countable.
H. An Example showing the Invalidity of (I)⇒(III): In this example, (a) we letΩ 0 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, F 0 = 2Ω 0 , and P 0 be such that P 0 (ω 0 ) = 1/8 for any ω 0 ∈Ω 0 ;
(b) we letΩ = {0, 1}, F = 2Ω, and function Ω be such that Ω(0, 1, 2, 3) = 0 and Ω(4, 5, 6, 7) = 1; (c) we letΘ 2 = {0, 1}, G 2 = 2Θ 2 , and function Θ 2 be such that Θ 2 (0, 1, 4, 5) = 0 and Θ 2 (2, 3, 6, 7) = 1; (d) we letΘ 1 = {0, 1}, G 1 = 2Θ
1 , and function Θ 1 be such that Θ 1 (0, 2, 4, 6) = 0 and Θ 1 (1, 3, 5, 7) = 1.
It is easy to see that Θ −1 1 (G 1 ) is not contained in Θ −1 2 (G 2 ). So (III) is not true. On the other hand, we can verify that, P (ω) = 1/2 for any ω ∈Ω, Q 1(2) (θ 1(2) ) = 1/2 for any θ 1(2) ∈Θ 1(2) , R 1(2) (ω | θ 1(2) ) = 1/2 for any ω ∈Ω and θ 1(2) ∈Θ 1 (2) , and S 2 1 (θ 2 | θ 1 ) = 1/2 for any θ 2 ∈Θ 2 and θ 1 ∈Θ 1 . We do have (19) , since Q 2 (θ 2 ) = 1/2 = 1/2 × 1/2 + 1/2 × 1/2
and, we do have (20) , since
Hence, (I) is true for this example.
I. Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof. Since Θ 12 is a (Θ 1 , G 1 )/(Θ 2 , G 2 ) function, we have
Therefore, we will have
where the equality is due to the definition in (23).
J. Proof of Theorem 4.4
Proof. Given any (Γ, T )/(Θ 1 , G 1 ) kernel Y 1 (function γ 1 ), we can derive (Γ, T )/(Θ 2 , G 2 ) kernel Y 2 (function γ 2 ) by letting
Thus defined kernel Y 2 (function γ 2 ) is clearly performance-matching.
K. An Example showing the Invalidity of (III)⇒(III'): Here, (a) we letΩ 0 = {0, 1, 2, 3} and F 0 = 2Ω 0 ;
(b) we let (Ω, F ) = (Ω 0 , F 0 ) and function Ω be the identity mapping;
(c) we letΘ 2 = {0, 1}, G 2 = 2Θ 2 , and function Θ 2 be such that Θ 2 (0, 1) = 0 and Θ 2 (2, 3) = 1;
(d) we letΘ 1 = {0, 1}, G 1 = {∅,Θ 1 }, and function Θ 1 be such that Θ 1 (0, 2) = 0 and Θ 2 (1, 3) = 1. We note that 
And yet, we do not have a certain Θ 1 (ω) when Θ 2 (ω) is exactly known: when Θ 2 (ω) is either 0 or 1, Θ 1 (ω) can be 0 or 1.
